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Report on the Response to the Fire on April 15, 1998 at Siemens Power Corporation

Richland, Washington, August 1998

TABLE OF CONTENTS

• I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• II. DESCRIPTION OF RESPONSE ACTIVITIES
• III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
• Issue #1: Incorrect Notification Form and Verbal Information
• Issue #2: Timeliness and Sequence of Notification
• Issue #3: The Answering Service Did Not Obtain Clear Information
• Conclusion
• IV. SUPPORTING DATA
• Attachment One -- Call Center Log
• Attachment Two -- Classification Notification Form
• Attachment Three -- Siemens Notification
• Attachment Four -- Sampling Results
• Attachment Five -- Meeting Minutes; August 11, 1998

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Siemens Power Corporation - Nuclear Division Engineering and Manufacturing Facility- is a nuclear fuel fabrication facility located on Horns Rapid Road in Richland, Washington. During testing of the fire alarm system on April 15, 1998 a Fire Protection Engineer noticed an alarm from the UO2 Facility. Upon investigation, at approximately 0806 it was verified that a fire had broken out in a 4-ft x 4-ft waste sorting basket filled with vinyl gloves and paper in the hot radioactive maintenance shop of the Uranium Oxide Facility. Richland Fire Department (RFD) was notified and responded in 11 minutes. The fire was extinguished.

The UO2 Building houses the majority of the fuel fabrication activities. Enriched uranium is stored in a specially controlled area prior to being made into fuel pellets. If a moderator such as water surrounds the uranium, the quantity of thermal (slow) neutrons may increase, in turn, increasing the possibility of a criticality accident. To prevent this potential hazard, water was applied sparingly to the waste sorting basket before it was removed from the building. The low-level waste began to smolder and flare again. A tarp was put on the ground and the basket placed on top of it. RFD applied water, soaking the contents of the waste-sorting basket.

The event was classified as an ALERT at 0818. The Fire was extinguished by 0823 and the event was declassified at 0833. The ALERT classification and declassification notification were verbally given to Benton County at 0850. The Washington State Emergency Management Division (EMD) Duty Officer received notification from Siemens at 0859.

The Washington Department of Health's (DOH) Emergency Response Duty Officer (ERDO) received notification of the event from the EMD Duty Officer at approximately 0920. Information given to DOH indicated the event was "an Emergency ALERT DOE -RL in the UO2 Building." Because EMD was unaware of the Siemens facility and its hazards, they assumed the facility belonged to the Department of Energy. (DOE-RL)

A call from the NRC Region IV office at approximately 1000 confirmed that the fire was at Siemens, not DOE-RL.

Office of Radiation Protection Health Physicists stationed in Richland were dispatched to Siemens to follow up on the event.

Siemens reported to DOH that no offsite release was believed to have occurred. The survey of Richland Fire Department personnel found one boot with 400 dpm alpha. No other contamination above background was found. A survey of the controlled area indicated one spot, 1200 dpm/100 cm2. This area was decontaminated and the controlled area released. The area above the door and the roof were surveyed and were found less than 200 dpm/100 cm2. Analysis of Siemens' sample results confirms no significant releases of radioactive contaminants.

II. DESCRIPTION OF RESPONSE ACTIVITIES TO SIEMENS ALERT ON APRIL 15, 1998

Time	Event
0806	Fire Alarm sounds in UO2 Building at Siemens Power Corp. (Siemens) while fire alarms are being tested.
0806	Siemens calls Benton County 911 to request fire assistance
0818	Fire classified in accordance with Siemens procedures as ALERT
0823	Fire Out
~0830	Richland Fire Chief calls Terry Hobbs, Benton County Emergency Management to inform her of a small fire at Siemens, in UO2 Building
0833	ALERT is reclassified as "ALERT Over" on same INF as the ALERT notification.
0850	Siemens verbally notifies Benton County Emergency Management of the ALERT.
~0850	Siemens gives verbal notification to Allied Technical Group, Department of Energy's Occurrence Notification Center, and Czebotar Farms
0859	EMD Duty Officer receives verbal notification of ALERT from Siemens. No INF was sent or faxed.
0900	Siemens sends a fax of their INF to Benton County
0917	DOH ERDO paged by answering service
0920	206-NUCLEAR line rings while dialing answering service; EMD duty officer notifies Department of Health ERDO of "an Emergency ALERT at DOE-RL in the UO2 Building." The point of contact at Siemens was Christine Kragcik.
0924	ERDO called answering service - received similar notification - but the answering service did not identify the initiator of the ALERT.
0926	ERDO notifies Health Staff in accordance with Department of Health Response Procedures for Radiation Emergencies procedures: Susan May, Mike Robertson, John Erickson. Al Conklin
0926	Faxed Notification Form of ALERT (stamped 0826), received by DOH on Supply System Incident Notification Form.
0951	Benton County receives fax of the notification from EMD on Supply System Incident Notification Form.
~1000	Al Conklin receives notification from Linda McClean of the NRC Region IV office concerning the Siemens ALERT.
1004	Southeast Communications Center (Benton County Dispatch) receives fax from Siemens.
1010	Al Conklin advises John Erickson and Anine Grumbles that, according to the NRC, the ALERT is at Siemens, not at Supply System or DOE-RL.
~1020	Anine Grumbles (ERDO) briefs Terry Frazee of sequence of events.
1030	Al Conklin assigns Richland staff to investigate the incident on scene.
1030	The ERDO calls the EMD Duty Officer to advise them of the information received from the NRC.
~1100	Debra McBaugh (Environmental Section Supervisor) calls Al Danielson to join John Schmidt and John Martell to represent the environmental section on the incident follow-up at Siemens.
1215	DOH receives a copy of Siemens Incident Notification Form with the ALERT as well as a blank form.
~1300	The DOH Health Physicists from the Richland Office arrive at Siemens to follow-up on the incident.

III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Issue #1: Incorrect Notification Form and Verbal Information sent to Department of Health and Benton County

Neither the EMD Duty Officer nor the Benton County Dispatch was aware of a specific notification form for Siemens. Blank copies were not available for recording notification information. A Supply System Classification Notification Form (CNF) was used to convey the information.

The EM duty officer who initially notified the ERDO via phone announced that there was "an Emergency ALERT at DOE-RL in the UO2 Building." The Duty Officer assumed the call was from the Department of Energy because of the lack of clear identification in the call and lack of knowledge of the Siemens facility and its associated hazards.

Recommendation: There is no formal protocol in place between Siemens and Emergency Management or the Department of Health for receiving classified emergency notifications. The State and Benton County should work with Siemens to develop/improve procedures for notification of events at Siemens.

Issue #2: Timeliness and Sequence of Notification

Benton County received verbal notification from Siemens 32 minutes after the classification of the ALERT. Siemens Power Corporation faxes notification form to Benton County 42 minutes after classification.

Washington Emergency Management (EMD) received verbal notification from Siemens 41 minutes after the classification of ALERT. The Duty Officer, unaware of Siemens' hazard or the existence of a form, did not request a hard copy of the Incident Notification Form.

EMD verbally notifies the Department of Health 66 minutes after the classification of the ALERT.

Discussion:

Siemens Power Corporation Emergency Plan, Part I, Section 3.0, Classification and Notification of Accidents provides no guidance as to time requirements for notifying offsite agencies. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) 1.1, Classifying an Emergency and 4.2, Incident Notification Worksheet - Offsite Agencies also do not indicate any time requirements. The only location where time requirements for notification can be found is in Part II, Quick Reference Guide. Section 1.3.5 of this guide indicates that Siemen Power Corporation's interpretation of "immediate notifications" is less than 1 hour.

US NRC Regulatory Guide (Reg Guide) 3.67, Standard Format and Content for Emergency Plans for Fuel Cycle and Materials Facilities, Section C, items 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 recommend that notifications be made "normally within 15 minutes of declaring an Alert/Site Area Emergency". The NRC has approved Siemens' plan and procedures with the 1 hour time requirement.

The county is responsible for the timely protection of residents and must therefore receive notification of any emergency in a timely manner so that appropriate protective measures may be evaluated and implemented. One concern is a daycare facility located approximately 1.25 miles from Siemens, who may not have the capability to evacuate.

The State of Washington's Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection (DRP), the State's lead response agency for radiological emergencies, feels that the 1 hour allowance for notification needs review because it may not provide adequate notification to permit necessary offsite protective actions to be implemented, especially in the event of a release of hazardous materials.

Recommendation: Siemens Power Corporation should meet with Benton County and State representatives to discuss notification time requirements and prioritize notifications. DOH will work with Siemens and the NRC to see if the time requirement for notification of offsites to that indicated in RegGuide 3.67 is adequate and if greater emphasis on notifying Benton County and Siemens site neighbors within that 15 minute time frame is necessary. The State and the NRC can be notified after the county and the site neighbors.

Issue #3: The answering service for Nuclear Safety did not obtain clear information.

Siemens Power Corporation did not clearly identify itself to DOH

The answering service for Nuclear Safety (The Call Center) did not obtain the name of the facility and Siemens Power Corporation did not clearly identify themselves to The Call Center operator. Siemens Security staff may have assumed that they were talking to a Department of Health employee when delivering the information to the answering service. The Call Center also did not fax information regarding the call the following day, as requested.

Siemens did not clearly identify themselves as Siemens Power Corporation when the ERDO called to verify information concerning the ALERT. "Security" was their only acknowledgment, upon answering the phone. This added to the mix-up about the location of the fire.

Recommendation: Nuclear Safety should revise the answering service procedures to clarify the instructions and include all requests in writing. The section should further train the Call Center staff on the procedures and on obtaining essential information.

Siemens and the State and local agencies should work together to coordinate our notification methods so that the communication process works efficiently and effectively. Participation in communication drills and other drills and exercises would improve effectiveness.

Conclusion:

Many of the issues arising from the April 15 ALERT occurred due to a of lack of understanding of each other's emergency response protocols and responsibilities.

In order to ensure adequate protection of the health and safety of the public, a meeting was coordinated on August 11, 1998, with all affected agencies, to gain a better understanding of each other's capabilities, responsibilities, and needs. The session identified areas where specific plans and procedures should be revised so that they can be integrated with each other. The minutes to that meeting are attached.

Building trust will help all of us to better handle future emergencies. Smoothing out the communication and notification processes should be the first step.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

For more information on the Department's emergency preparedness for radiation emergencies or for copies of the supporting data to this report, please contact Leo Wainhouse, Supervisor, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Section.

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