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Other links
concerning Notifiable Conditions |
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Associated Programs |
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Surveillance and Reporting Guidelines for
Diseases of a Suspected
Bioterrorism Origin
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back to
Bioterrorism index page |
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Disease
Reporting |
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In Washington |
DOH has never received a
confirmed report of disease of suspected bioterrorism origin.
In 1984, a cult based in The Dalles, Oregon – within 20 miles of
the Washington border – sprayed Salmonella on salad bars
at local restaurants in an attempt to cause illness and thereby
influence an election. In Washington, state and local public
health have responded to many bioterrorism hoaxes, including
letters claiming to contain anthrax, by recommending testing
when appropriate and working closely with law enforcement
agencies. |
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Purpose of Reporting and
Surveillance |
- To notify appropriate agencies and mobilize necessary
resources for public health response and possible criminal
investigation.
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Reporting Requirements |
- Health care providers: immediately notifiable to Local
Health Jurisdiction
- Hospitals: immediately notifiable to Local Health
Jurisdiction
- Laboratories: see disease-specific requirements
- Local health jurisdictions: suspected or confirmed
cases are immediately notifiable to DOH Communicable Disease
Epidemiology: 1-877-539-4344
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Case Definition for Surveillance |
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Clinical Criteria for Diagnosis |
See disease-specific guidelines. |
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Epidemiologic Clues That May Signal A Possible Bioterrorism
Event |
- Large numbers of ill persons with a similar disease or
syndrome.
- Large numbers of cases of unexplained diseases or
deaths.
- Unusual illness in a population (e.g., renal disease in
a large population may suggest exposure to a toxic agent
such as mercury).
- Higher morbidity and mortality in association with a
common disease or syndrome or failure of such patients to
respond to usual therapy.
- Single case of disease caused by an uncommon agent
(e.g., Burkholderia mallei or B. pseudomallei,
smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fever, pulmonary anthrax)
- Several unusual or unexplained diseases coexisting in
the same patient without any other explanation.
- Disease with an unusual geographic or seasonal
distribution (e.g., tularemia in a nonendemic area,
influenza in the summer).
- Illness that is unusual (or atypical) for a given
population or age group (e.g., outbreak of measles-like rash
in adults).
- Unusual disease presentation, (e.g., pulmonary instead
of cutaneous anthrax).
- Similar genetic type among agents isolated from distinct
sources at different times or locations.
- Unusual, atypical, genetically engineered, or antiquated
strain of an agent (or antibiotic resistance pattern).
- Stable endemic disease with an unexplained increase in
incidence (e.g., tularemia, plague).
- Simultaneous clusters of similar illness in
noncontiguous areas, domestic or foreign.
- Aerosol route of infection or other atypical pattern of
disease transmission.
- Ill persons who seek treatment at about the same time
(point source with compressed epidemic curve).
- No illness in persons who are not exposed to common
ventilation systems (have separate closed ventilation
systems) when illness is seen in persons in close proximity
who have a common ventilation system.
- Unusual pattern of death or illness among animals,
(which may be unexplained or attributed to an agent of
bioterrorism) that precedes or accompanies illness or death
in humans.
Reference: Biological Warfare &
Terrorism, The Military and Public Health Response, Satellite
Broadcast, September 21-23, 1999. |
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Bioterrorism Agent Categories |
Bioterrorism Agent Categories
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
classifies potential bioterrorist agents into three
categories.Category A
The US public health system and primary healthcare
providers must be prepared to address varied biological
agents, including pathogens that are rarely seen in the United
States. High-priority agents include organisms that pose a
risk to national security because they:
- can be easily disseminated or transmitted
person-to-person,
- result in high mortality rates and have the potential
for major public health impact,
- might cause public panic and social disruption, and
- require special action for public health preparedness.
Category A agents include:
- Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)
- Smallpox (variola major)
- Plague (Yersinia pestis)
- Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin)
- Tularemia (Francisella tularensis)
- Filoviruses (e.g., ebola hemorrhagic fever, marburg
hemorrhagic fever)
- Arenaviruses (e.g., Lassa (Lassa Fever), Junin
(Argentine hemorrhagic fever) and related viruses)
Category B
The second highest priority agents include those
that:
- are moderately easy to disseminate,
- result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality
rates, and
- require specific enhancements of CDC’s diagnostic
capacity and enhanced disease surveillance.
Category B agents include:
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Brucellosis (Brucella species)
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Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens
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Food safety threats (e.g., Salmonella species, Escherichia
coli O157:H7, Shigella)
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Glanders (Burkholderia mallei)
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Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei)
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Psittacosis (Chlamydia psittaci)
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Q Fever (Coxiella burnetti)
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Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans)
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Staphylococcal enterotoxin B
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Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazekii)
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Viral encephalitis (e.g., Venezuelan equine encephalitis,
eastern and western equine encephalitis)
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Water safety threats (e.g., Vibrio cholerae, Cryptosporidium
parvum)
Category C
Third highest priority agents include emerging pathogens
that could be engineered for mass dissemination in the future
because of:
- availability,
- ease of production and dissemination, and
- potential for high morbidity and mortality rates and
major health impact.
Category C agents include:
Preparedness for List C agents requires ongoing research to
improve disease detection, diagnosis, treatment, and
prevention. Knowing in advance which newly emergent pathogens
might be employed by terrorists is not possible; therefore,
linking bioterrorism preparedness efforts with ongoing disease
surveillance and outbreak response activities as defined in
CDC's emerging infectious disease strategy is imperative.
Reference:
www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist.asp |
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