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Surveillance and Reporting Guidelines for
Smallpox
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back to
Smallpox index page |
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Note |
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The last naturally acquired case of smallpox in the world
occurred in October 1977 in Somalia; global eradication was
certified two years later by the WHO and sanctioned by the World
Health Assembly (WHA) in May 1980. Except for a laboratory
associated smallpox death at the University of
Birmingham, England, in 1978,
no cases have been identified since. All known smallpox (variola)
virus stocks are held under security at the CDC,
Atlanta, Georgia, or the State Research
Centre of Virology and Biotechnology, Koltsovo, Novosibirsk
Region, Russian Federation.
Because of the potential use of clandestine supplies of variola
virus for biowarfare or bioterrorism, it is important that
health care workers become familiar with the clinical and
epidemiologic features of smallpox and how it was distinguished
from chickenpox. Even though strains of virus used for
biowarfare might have been engineered so that clinical
differences may result, past experience with naturally occurring
variola remains the best guide to recognition and management of
an epidemic pox virus disease. |
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Disease
Reporting |
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In Washington |
The last case of smallpox
reported in
Washington
State occurred in 1946. |
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Purpose of Reporting and
Surveillance |
- To assist in diagnosis of cases.
- To notify appropriate agencies and mobilize necessary
resources for public health response and possible criminal
investigation.
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Reporting Requirements |
- Health care providers: immediately notifiable to Local
Health Jurisdiction
- Hospitals: immediately notifiable to Local Health
Jurisdiction
- Laboratories: immediately notifiable, specimens
must be tested at CDC through arrangement with DOH
Communicable Disease Epidemiology
- Local health jurisdictions: suspected or confirmed
cases are immediately notifiable to DOH Communicable Disease
Epidemiology: 1-877-539-4344
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Case Definition for Surveillance |
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Clinical Criteria for Diagnosis |
An illness with acute onset of
fever > 101o F (38.3o C) followed
by a rash characterized by vesicles or firm pustules in the same
stage of development without other apparent cause. |
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Laboratory Criteria for Diagnosis |
- Isolation of smallpox (variola) virus from a clinical
specimen (level D laboratory only), or
- Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assay identification of
variola DNA in a clinical specimen (level D laboratory or
approved level C laboratory only), or
- Negative stain electron microscopic (EM) identification
of variola virus in a clinical specimen (level D laboratory
or approved level C laboratory only).
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Case Definition |
- Probable: A case that meets the clinical case
definition, is not laboratory confirmed, but has an
epidemiological link to a confirmed or probable case.
- Confirmed: A clinically compatible case that is
laboratory confirmed.
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A. Description |
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1. Identification |
Smallpox was a systemic viral disease that generally presented
with a characteristic skin eruption. Onset was sudden, with
fever, malaise, headache, prostration, severe backache and
occasional abdominal pain and vomiting; a clinical picture that
resembled influenza. After 2 to 4 days, the fever began to fall
and a deep-seated rash developed in which individual lesions
containing infectious virus progressed through successive stages
of macules, papules, vesicles, pustules and crusted scabs which
fell off after three to four weeks. The lesions were first
evident on the face and extremities and subsequently on the
trunk-the so-called centrifugal rash distribution-and were at
the same stage of development in a given area.
Two epidemiologic types of smallpox were recognized during the
20th century: variola minor (alastrim), which had a case
fatality rate of less than 1% and variola major (ordinary) with
a fatality rate among unvaccinated populations of 20-40% or
more. Fatalities normally occurred between the 5th and 7th day,
occasionally as late as the 2nd week. Less than 3% of variola
major cases experienced fulminating disease with a severe
prodrome, prostration, and bleeding into the skin and mucous
membranes; such hemorrhagic cases were rapidly fatal. The usual
rash did not appear and the disease might have been confused
with severe leukemia, meningococcemia or idiopathic
thrombocytopenic purpura. In previously vaccinated persons, the
rash was significantly modified to the extent that only a few
highly atypical lesions might be seen. Generally the prodromal
illness was not modified but the stages of the lesions were
accelerated with crusting by the 10th day.
Most frequently smallpox was confused with chickenpox in which
the skin lesions commonly occur in successive crops with several
stages of maturity at the same time. The chickenpox rash is more
abundant on covered than on exposed parts of the body; the rash
is centripetal rather than centrifugal. Smallpox was indicated
by a clear-cut prodromal illness; by the appearance of all
lesions more or less simultaneously when the fever broke; by the
similarity of appearance of all lesions in a given area rather
than successive crops; and by more deep-seated lesions, which
often involved sebaceous glands and scarring of the pitted
lesions. By contrast, the chickenpox lesions are superficial.
Smallpox lesions were virtually never seen at the apex of the
axilla.
Outbreaks of variola minor (alastrim) appeared in the late 19th
century. Although the rash was like that in ordinary smallpox,
patients generally experienced less severe systemic reactions,
and hemorrhagic cases were virtually unknown. Although the last
cases of smallpox in Somalia in the late 1970s were classified
as variola minor, DNA studies indicated that the virus was more
like that of variola major than true alastrim virus, which
suggested that this was an attenuated variola major. Laboratory
confirmation was by isolation of the virus on chorioallantoic
membranes or tissue culture from the scrapings of lesions, from
vesicular or pustular fluid, from crusts, and sometimes from
blood during the febrile preeruptive stage. A rapid provisional
diagnosis was often possible by electron microscopy or the
immunodiffusion technique. Now these methods would be superseded
by more rapid and accurate PCR methods. |
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2. Infectious Agent |
Variola virus, a species of
Orthopoxvirus. Mapping of endonuclease cleavage sites of several
strains of variola has been done, and the complete DNA sequences
of two major strains are published. |
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3. Worldwide Occurrence |
Formerly a worldwide disease; no
known humans cases since 1978. |
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4. Reservoir |
Officially, only in designated
freezers in the US and in Russia. |
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5. Modes of Transmission |
The secondary attack rate among
unvaccinated populations was about 50% depending on the
outbreak. If used in biowarfare, the agent would most likely be
disseminated in an aerosol cloud. |
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6. Incubation Period |
From 7-19 days; commonly 10-14
days to onset of illness and 2-4 days more to onset of rash. |
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7. Period of Communicability |
From the time of development of
the earliest lesions to disappearance of all scabs; about 3
weeks. The patient is most contagious during the preeruptive
period by aerosol droplets from oropharyngeal lesions. |
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8. Susceptibility and Resistance |
Susceptibility among the
unvaccinated is universal. |
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B. Methods of Control |
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Control of smallpox is based on immunization with vaccinia
virus. Should a nonvaricella, smallpox-like case be suspected,
IMMEDIATE TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION WITH
LOCAL AND STATE HEALTH AUTHORITIES IS OBLIGATORY: CDC
SHOULD BE CONTACTED ALSO. The CDC bioterrorism response
coordination hotline is (770) 488-7100.
Specific treatment: Henderson DA, Inglesby TV, Bartlett JG, et
al. Smallpox as a biological weapon: medical and public health
management. JAMA 1999; 281 (22):2127-2137 (In Additional
resources). |
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